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STUDENT NOTES

DIRECT DEMOCRACY THROUGH INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM: CHECKING THE BALANCE
CHRISTOPHER

I.

A. COURY*

INTRODUCTION

One desire in American democracy - to live in a society in
which the government is not absolute, but rather subject to a system of checks and balances - lives as robustly today as it did
when this nation was founded. Many state constitutions embody
this principle by reserving for the people methods of direct legislation through the referendum and the initiative. The drafters of
these constitutions, concerned with corrupt legislators and their
agendas, intended to empower the people to introduce, consider, and vote upon issues themselves.'
There are two different forms of direct legislation. The first
of these is the initiative. Initiatives are proposed laws which not
only are drafted by citizens, but which can be enacted by the voters without the state legislature.2 The other form of direct legislation is the referendum. A referendum empowers citizens to
place a law passed by the state legislature on the ballot, where it
may be overturned.' For both initiatives and referenda, citizens
place the proposals on the ballots by obtaining and submitting a
fixed number of signatures, and complying with other statutory
requirements.
* B.A., 1991, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1994, Notre Dame Law
School; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1992-1994. This article is dedicated to my
parents with gratitude for their love, guidance, and support.
1. John McFarland, Politics and Sin: Today's Initiatives the Product of
Yesteyyear's Abuses, L.A. DAILYJ., Oct. 2, 1984, at 4.
2. Dan Walters, Is It Time to Retake the Initiative?,L.A. DAILvJ., Apr. 5, 1989,
at 6.
3. Id. Another form of direct democracy is the recall. Whereas in
initiatives and referenda, citizens are voting on legislation, in a recall election,
by comparison, voters have the power to remove a public official from office in
the middle of a term. Id. This discussion will not examine the recall.
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In recent years, voters have begun taking matters into their
own hands more frequently by introducing proposed legislation,
not to the legislature, but to the citizens of the state by way of the
ballot. 4 Moreover, an increased number of legislative acts have

been channelled to the citizens through referenda. 5 Accordingly,
it is fair to describe direct legislation through initiatives and referenda as a prolific part of the political landscape in the many
parts of the United States.
As the referendum and initiative have become "a fourth
branch of government" in many states, several problems have
surfaced as well. 6 Most problems of direct legislation result from
the lack of regulation of this process. This article will examine
five problematic aspects of referenda and initiatives. It will then
propose several reforms to address the excesses previously identified. This discussion will reveal that fine tuning the process of
direct legislation through increased regulation not only would
preserve this check on state government, but also would enhance
the ability of the referendum and initiative effectively to gauge
and to implement the will of the voting population.
II.

FIvE PROBLEMS OF

DiRECr DEMOCRACY

An analysis of modern initiatives and referenda in the
United States reveals five problematic aspects of direct legislation. First, the procedures regulating initiatives and referenda
may fail to protect voters adequately against poor drafting, multiple propositions on one issue, and late legal challenges. Second,
ballot measures may contain provisions which invidiously discriminate or deny civil or human rights, yet legal attacks on the
substance of the propositions generally are not engaged until the
law is enacted. Third, the quantity of propositions in elections
can confuse voters. Fourth, educating voters about an increased
number of ballot measures has become increasingly difficult and
decreasingly effective. Finally, voters may fail to account for the
effects which may arise from the enactment or defeat of ballot
measures. This section will examine each of these aspects individually, both by discussing the problem in the abstract and by
presenting case studies from recent elections.
4. See generally Michael deCourcey Hinds, Frustrated Governors Bypass
Legislators With Voter Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 16, 1992 (National Edition)
(page and column unavailable); James W. Sweeney, Ballot Measures Can
Circumvent Stalled Assembly-Breaks the Lobby-Lock, L.A. DMLYJ., Jan. 1, 1990, at

1; Ronald A. Zumbrun, Courts Can Bring Sanity to the Process, L.A. DAILY J., July
18, 1990, at 6.
5. Hinds, supra note 4; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 1.
6. Hinds, supra note 4.
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A.

ProceduralProblems

Three procedural problems have surfaced in recent elections. First, poor drafting of ballot measures in conjunction with
the inability to compromise often defeats worthy initiatives and
referenda. Second, ballot measure sponsors often include multiple issues in one ballot proposition in an attempt to log-roll the
weaker provision past the electorate. Finally, opponents to propositions often plan their legal challenges to ensure that there is
not ample time for the merits of the issues to be completely adjudicated before the printing of the ballots and/or the election. As
the following discussion indicates, minor regulations in each of
these areas would sufficiently remedy the problems.
1. Poor Drafting of Ballot Propositions
In 1992, Arizona's Proposition 200 was an initiative measure
which proposed to regulate the taking of wildlife on public
lands.7 In the initiative's Declaration of Policy, the drafters
stated "[i] t is the intention and desire of the people of Arizona to
make our public lands safe and humane for all creatures found
on Arizona's public lands. We desire to manage our wildlife and
protect our property by humane and NON-LETHAL METHODS. We,
therefore, propose the following initiative."' The actual text of
the statute which followed proceeded to outlaw such devices as
leghold traps, conibear style traps of the instant kill or body-gripping type design, snares, explosives and poisons.' It expressly
allowed the use of such devices where necessary to protect
human life, and it did not restrict the use of guns.1 °
In the analysis of Proposition 200, the Legislative Counsel
stated that the restriction "should not prohibit ... [r]egulated

hunting or fishing with guns or other 'implements in hand'." 1
Nevertheless, opponents of the measure focused upon the
phrase "non-lethal" in the Statement of Policy and launched an
intensive media blitz that Proposition 200 would ban all fishing
soundly
and hunting on public lands.' 2 This proposition 1 was
3
margin.
percent
37.9
to
percent
62.1
a
by
defeated
7.

See

ARIZONA

SECRETARY

OF

STATE.

ARIZONA

PUBLICITY

PAMPHLET,

84-92 (Nov. 3, 1992).
Id. at 84 (Text of Proposition 200) (emphasis added).

GENERAL ELECTION

8.
9.

ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 84-92 (Nov. 3, 1992).

10. Id.
11. Id. at 85.
12. Richard Lessner, Razing Arizona: Proposition 200 Meets the Heritage
Fund, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1992, at C4.
13. Proposition Results, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1992, at AA5.
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Arizona's experience in 1992 with Proposition 200 illustrates
one common procedural problem with initiatives and referenda-namely, how poor drafting can doom an otherwise beneficial piece of legislation. While a legislature can clarify
ambiguous language through discussion and compromise, this
avenue is not available with direct legislation. For example, had
Arizona's Proposition 200 contained one sentence which
expressly exempted hunting and fishing from the scope of this
policy, or had the word "non-lethal" been deleted, as the drafters
intended, it might have passed. Clarifying the intent and effect
of this initiative was impossible. Consequently, Arizona voters
were presented with an all or nothing decision on their ballots,
despite the ambiguous language contained in the initiatives.' 4
2.

Logrolling Multiple Issues15

In the election of June 5, 1990, California voters considered
Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.' 6 This
initiative measure covered the following issues: postindictment
preliminary hearings; independent construction of state constitutional criminal rights; due process and speedy, public trials; joinder and severance of cases; hearsay testimony at preliminary
hearings; discovery procedures; voir dire examinations; the felony-murder statute; special circumstances statutes; the torture
statute; appointment of counsel; trial dates and continuances;
the severance clause; and the requirement
of a super-majority for
7
amendment by the legislature.'
In Raven v. Deukmejian,'8 Proposition 115 was challenged as
violating the single-subject rule under the California Constitution. 1" The California Supreme Court stated that "an initiative
measure does not violate the single-subject requirement 'if,
despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are "reasonably
germane" to each other' and to the general purpose or object of
14. For a discussion of potential reforms for this and other problems
identified in this section, see infra. notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
15. "Logrolling" is defined as the "practice of including in one statute or
constitutional amendment more than one proposition, inducing voters to vote
for all, notwithstanding they might not have voted for all if amendments or
statutes had been submitted separately." BLACK's LAW DICrONARY 942 (6th ed.
1990).
16. A brief summary of the numerous provisions contained within this
initiative is contained in Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Cal. 1990).
17. Id. at 1080-83.
18. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
19. The California Constitution states: "An initiative measure embracing
more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
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the initiative."2" Remarkably, Proposition 115 withstood this constitutional challenge under the single-subject rule because its
provisions involved a "common concern, 'general object' or 'general subject'."" The court expressly rejected the argument that
logrolling existed in Proposition 115, despite the large number
of provisions. It stated that the risk of logrolling
is inherent in the passage of most laws, whether enacted by
the Legislature or by initiative, in which benefits and burdens must be evaluated. . . . 'The decision to enact laws,
whether directly by the people or through their22representatives involves the weighing of pros and cons.'
The court concluded that voters "duly considered and comprehended" the nature of the initiative's provisions, because the
proposition was subjected to intense public focus and the voters
themselves received an official election pamphlet which contained the text, analysis, and arguments favoring and opposing
the propositions. 23 In short, the court stated that because voters
had ample opportunity to understand the nature of the proposition, the provisions of Proposition 115 were valid even if logrolling did occur.
In essence, the California Supreme Court adopted the view
that logrolling is as palatable in citizen-initiatives as in legislative
bills. This standard of review of ballot measures is troublesome
for two reasons. First, it ignores the essence of the "all or nothing" decision which voters must make. Legislators can debate,
modify, and attempt to tailor a particular bill if so inclined, but
voters must vote for a ballot measure as it comes to them or
reject it in its entirety. For this reason, logrolling is much more
troublesome in direct legislation than it is in legislative law-making. The second troubling aspect of the California Supreme
Court's position is its willingness to allow logrolling given the
complexities of ballot propositions, the possibility of deceptive
advertising, and the lack of understandable objective information that is made available for the electorate. Whether voters can
decipher and comprehend enough information about an initiative or referendum to consider the issue meaningfully should be
questioned when evaluating single-subject rule challenges; it cer-

20.
279 (Cal.
21.
22.

23.

Raven, 801 P.2d at 1083 (quoting Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274,
1982)).
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1085.

Id.
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tainly should not be assumed solely because information is available to the general public.2 4
As Raven demonstrates, California's "reasonably germane"
standard of review provides little protection for voters against
parties placing an initiative containing multiple, loosely-related
issues on the ballot. In Arizona, courts apply a preferable standard of review that substantially inhibits logrolling.2 5 Arizona
courts examine the provisions contained within ballot measures
to determine whether "logically speaking, they should stand or
fall as a whole."2 6 This test also examines the purpose of the ballot measure to determine whether voters should reasonably favor
or oppose all of the provisions contained within the proposition.
If voters could reasonably be expected to split between the provisions, the proposition would violate the single-subject rule.2 7
The Arizona standard hinders logrolling much more than
does the California standard. Moreover, given the lack of compromise inherent to ballot measures and the common difficulty
of understanding the effects of these propositions, the Arizona
judicial standard provides greater protection to voters against
hidden provisions which would not pass on their own. Finally,
the Arizona standard holds the state accountable only for those
ballot proposals to which the electorate validly consents.
3.

Lack of Timely Challenges

Proposition 110 on Arizona's 1992 General Election Ballot
demonstrates the need for regulation of pre-election challenges.
This initiative proposed: (i) to prohibit the use of public funds to
pay for abortions; and (ii) to restrict the number of instances in
which abortions would be legally permissible within Arizona.
The sequence and timing of events related to Proposition
110 illustrate another concern with initiatives. On August 7,
1991, the text of the initiative became available to the public
when proponents submitted it to the Arizona's Secretary of State
24. See infra. part II.D for a complete discussion of voter education
through official election publicity pamphlets.
25. The Arizona Constitution provides: "Ifmore than one proposed
amendment shall be submitted at any election, such proposed amendments
shall be presented in such a manner that the electors may vote for or against
such proposed amendments separately." ARiz. CONST. art XXI, § 1.
26. Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Ariz. 1987) (quoting Kerby v.
Luhrs, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (Ariz. 1934)).
27. It is interesting to note, however, that Arizona's Supreme Court
limited the application of this standard to initiatives proposing constitutional
amendments. It does not apply for ballot measures proposing statutes. See
Tilson, 737 P.2d 1367.
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in exchange for an application to place the measure on the
November 1992 ballot.2 8 Eleven months later, on July 2, 1992,
the proponents filed Proposition 110 and the statutory number
of signatures with the Secretary of State. 9 On July 10, 1992, the
League of Women voters submitted an argument against this initiative for insertion into the Arizona Publicity Pamphlet.3 0 Over
two months later, on September 15, 1992, the League of Women
Voters and other Plaintiffs filed a complaint and application for a
permanent injunction against Proposition 110, alleging that it
violated Arizona's single-subject rule."1 The complaint was
served to the Defendants on September 16, 1992.32 Not only did
September 17, but the trial
the Defendants have to respond on
33
was also held that same morning.
At the trial, defense counsel objected to expert testimony
being entered into evidence, stating
I would like to state for the record that I did not find out
what the testimony of the witness was going to be until I
heard it. I just received [the expert's] affidavit today, and
consequently I'm really not prepared to cross-examine the
witness.... 34
Even though the trial judge admitted, but did not consider, the
expert testimony, she ruled that Proposition 110 violated the single-subject rule and granted the Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction.3 5 On September 18 - the same day as the trial court
granted the injunction - the Defendants filed an appeal with
the Arizona Supreme Court. On September 22, the Supreme
Court not only heard oral arguments, but it also reversed the
trial court's judgment.3 6 Thus, in order to meet the September
23 deadline for submitting the general election ballots to the
printer, this case moved from its pleadings through its appeal in
one week.
In its opinion reversing the trial court, the Arizona Supreme
Court was disturbed by this challenge which did not allow time
for proper and deliberate adjudication. Using the equitable doc28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Mathieu v. Mahoney, 851 P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
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trine of laches,3 7 the court held that the challenge to Proposition
110 was not timely because it was filed only one week prior to the
deadline for printing the ballots. 8 The court found
this delay both unreasonable and prejudicial because it
strains the quality of decision making and is ultimately
unfair to all involved. It prejudiced defendants in the
preparation of their defense. Less than 24 hours passed
from the time the complaint was served until the time the
matter was litigated on the merits in the trial court. In 24
hours, defendants had to retain counsel; marshal their witnesses, facts and legal arguments; analyze the challenge;
research and brief the issues; and prepare for a trial on the
merits to defend against
undisclosed evidentiary materials
39
presented by plaintiffs.

This was ample justification for the court to apply the equitable
doctrine of laches. 4 °
The court also indicated that it was persuaded by the fact
that this was public litigation involving an election. It stated that
"[t]he ultimate prejudice in election cases is to the quality of decision making in questions of great importance.... [P]ublic litigation, such as election contests and challenges to ballot
propositions, implicates interests well beyond the parties to the
case." 4 The court, however, noted that this decision was not
only about "hardship on the lawyers" or "judicial inconvenience"
but rather
about simple fairness, nothing more nor less. It concerns
fairness to those who invested countless hours and substantial funds for almost a year in order to get Proposition 110
on the ballot for a public vote; fairness to the quarter of a
million citizens who signed the initiative petitions, as well
as those who labored to collect the signatures; and fairness
to a judicial process that earns public respect and support
by producing careful, well-reasoned decisions after a com37. Laches "is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or
claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to [an] adverse party, operates as [a] bar in [a] court of equity."
BLACK'S LAw DIcrioNARv 875 (6th ed. 1990).

38. Mathieu, 851 P.2d at 84. The court also noted a previous decision that
a challenge to a ballot measure was deemed timely when it was brought over six
weeks before absentee voting was to begin. Id. (citing Kromko v. Superior
Court, 811 P.2d 12, 18 (Ariz. 1991)).

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id.
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plete exposition of the issues. Simple fairness is the real
basis for applying the equitable doctrine of laches
here.... 42
Proposition 110 remained on the November 3, 1993 Arizona
and was ultimately defeated, 68.5 perGeneral Election ballot,
43
percent.
31.5
to
cent
B.

Substantive Problems

In almost every state which allows initiatives and referenda,
there are few, if any, restrictions on the substance of propositions
which will appear on the ballot for consideration by the general
public. Anything is fair game. The following analysis will suggest
that, in at least two areas, some substantive issues do not belong
on the ballot. Although caution should be exercised when recommending substantive controls, the need for such controls
increases with each modern application of direct democracy.
1. Local or Low Profile Issues
Proposition 101 on Arizona's 1992 General Election Ballot
was a referendum from the state legislature which proposed to
increase the term of the State Mine Inspector from two to four
years. 4 The publicity pamphlet contained the legislative counsel's brief arguments for both sides of the issue. These presentations were, at best, facial attempts to comply with the statutory
requirement.4 5 Moreover, no additional arguments were pub42. Id.
43. Id. at 83 n.3.
44. ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 9-11 (Nov. 3, 1992).
45. ARIz. REX'. STAT. ANN. § 19-124 (Supp. 1992) provides:
B. Not later than sixty days preceding the regular primary
election the legislative council, after providing reasonable opportunity
for comments by all legislators, shall prepare and file with the
Secretary of State an impartial analysis of the provisions of each ballot
proposal of a measure or proposed amendment. The analysis shall
include a description of the measure and shall be written in clear and
concise terms avoiding technical terms wherever possible. The
analysis may contain background information, including the effect of
the measure on existing law, or any legislative enactment suspended
by referendum, if the measure or referendum is approved or rejected.
The analyses and arguments shall be included in the
C.
publicity pamphlet immediately following the measure or amendment
to which they refer ....
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lished in the publicity pamphlet.4 6 The coverage in Arizona's
largest paper, The Arizona Republic, was equally conclusory. 4 '
The treatment of Proposition 101 suggests at least two possible conclusions about this ballot measure. On one hand, the
lack of arguments on both sides may indicate that the term of the
State Mine Inspector was a non-controversial matter.4 8 If that
were the case, this issue should not have appeared on the ballot.
It could have been resolved by the legislature without much concern. On the other hand, the issue may have generated a good
deal of concern, but only to a minority within the state. In Arizona's 1992 general election, approximately seventy percent of
the total vote came from the counties in which metropolitan
Phoenix and Tucson lie.49 These counties do not contain mines,
nor are most of their voters exposed to the daily concerns of the
mining industry. Thus, it is possible (and indeed probable) that
a large percentage of the votes on Proposition 101 were cast with
little information, little concern, or both. Voters in mining communities may have had informed, strong opinions about this referendum and its effects on their daily lives, yet they were likely
outnumbered by the State's uninformed, urban majority. Ultimately resolving this issue in the legislature would have provided,
at a minimum, the opportunity for a minority with strong opinions both to present its positions and to lobby a good portion of
those making the final decision. By contrast, it is unlikely that
these groups possess the economic resources that would allow
them to voice their concerns and educate the ultimate decision
makers - the voters - in a similarly effective manner in statewide initiatives and referenda. Thus, resolving these types of
issues in the state legislature actually prevents these minority
groups from exposure to the potential apathy and ignorance of
the general electorate.
Proposition 101 demonstrates why ballot measures which
are either non-controversial or of local interest only properly
46.

ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL

ELECTION 9-11 (Nov. 3, 1992).
47. In its recommendations for the ballot propositions, the paper stated
the following in reference to Proposition 101: "Although all other state officials
serve four or six-year terms, the state mine inspector stands for election every
two years. This makes little sense. The mine inspector should be on the same
footing as other elected officials, as this amendment provides. We recommend
a 'yes' vote." Ballot Propositions: Our Recommendations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, October
31, 1992, at A22.
48. Indeed, this appears to be the case as the original bill passed easily in
both houses of Arizona's Legislature. See ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA
PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 9 (Nov. 3, 1992).
49. Election '92, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1992, at AA4-5.
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belong in the legislature. Propositions of little public concern
actually injure the public good, because they clutter the ballot
and risk that people may vote without giving due attention to the
proposal and its effects. On the other hand, ballot measures
which affect only a few communities create the risk that an ignorant and apathetic majority might unintentionally thwart their
cause. The legislature can give due attention to the concerns of
the minority and respond through negotiation and compromise.
2.

Ballot Measures Depriving Human or Civil Rights, or
Fostering Invidious Discrimination

To date, there have been no issues designated as unsuitable
for popular vote. Rather, citizen-groups have the ability to single
out a class of individuals and place discriminatory propositions
on the ballot. Moreover, voters can place issues implicating constitutional or human rights on the ballot as easily as they can
issues of minimal importance. The only limitations on the power
of the voters to present issues to their fellow citizens are the personal protections of the Federal and State Constitutions, and the
procedural requirements imposed by the state on direct legislation. But, as Colorado's experience with Amendment 2 indicates, sometimes increased protection is desirable.
In the November 3, 1992 election, Colorado voters passed
Amendment 2, which essentially constituted a ban on anti-discrimination laws protecting homosexuals.5 ° After the amendment was approved by voters, a lawsuit was filed on November 12,
1992; it alleged that the amendment was unconstitutional, and it
sought an injunction against its enforcement.5 ' The Plaintiffs
argued that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, a Colorado District
Court Judge issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the
50.

Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993). Amendment 2,

which passed 53.4% to 46.6%, provides:
No PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL, LESBIAN, OR BISEXUAL
ORIENTATION.

Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its

branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id, at 1272.
51. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
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enforcement of Amendment 2 until the outcome of a trial on the
merits.5 2 The Defendants appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunction in that case to the Colorado Supreme Court.5"
In its de novo review of the facts of this case, the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order.5 4 It said that the
"ultimate effect" of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective
statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future
unless the state constitution is first amended to permit
such measures.... Thus, the right to participate equally in
the political process is clearly affected by Amendment 2,
because it bars gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from having an effective voice in governmental affairs insofar as
those persons deem it beneficial to seek legislation that
would protect them from discrimination based on their
sexual orientation. Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a targeted class is prohibited from obtaining
legislative, executive, and judicial protection or redress
from discrimination absent the consent of a majority of the
electorate through
the adoption of a constitutional
55
amendment.

The court held that "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process,
and [that] any legislation or state constitutional amendment
which infringes on that right by 'fencing out' and independently
identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny."56 As the defendants failed to proffer a compelling state
interest on behalf of Amendment 2, the court concluded that
58
57
issuance of a preliminary injunction was proper. It affirmed
the Colorado District CourtJudge's order enjoining the enforcement of Amendment 2 pending the trial on the merits of the
alleged constitutional violations.5"
Colorado's experience with Amendment 2 illustrates how
provisions which are arguably unconstitutional can appear on
52. Id. at 1273.
53. Id. at 1274.
54. Id. at 1286.
55. Id. at 1285.
56. Id. at 1282.
57. Id. at 1286.
58. Id.
59. Amendment 2 was subsequently determined to be unconstitutional by
a Colorado District Court Judge because it deprived "the fundamental right of
an identifiable group to participate in the political process." Evans v. Romer,
No. ClV.A.92CV7223, 1993 WL 518586 at *9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).
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the ballot, and occasionally, even be approved by voters. Even if
courts ultimately strike down the law, many of the same issues
identified by the Arizona Supreme Court in Mathieu v. Mahoney
-

money, time, and effort

-

are wasted because the provision is

not kept off the ballot.
C.

Quantity of Ballot Measures

The third problematic aspect of modern direct democracy
involves the quantity of propositions. Concerns arise not only
from the sheer number of ballot measures in one election, but
also from multiple propositions covering one issue. Voter confusion, frustration, and apathy are common results. The following
analysis will examine both of these problems.
1. Multiple Propositions Covering One Issue in One Election
One of the most publicized examples of this problem
occurred in Arizona in 1990 with the two proposals-Propositions 301 and 302-to establish a state Martin Luther King
(MLK) holiday. Proposition 301 preserved the existing number
of paid holidays by: i) establishing a paid holiday honoring Dr.
King; and ii) eliminating Columbus Day as a paid holiday.'
Proposition 302 proposed to create an additional paid holiday in
honor of Dr. King.6" Voters rejected both referenda in the
election.6 2
The interplay between the propositions is a textbook example of the age-old maxim "divide and conquer." Both the Arizona Publicity Pamphlet, and the state's largest newspaper
suggested the following vote combinations:
If you favor both a (Martin Luther) King Day and a
Columbus Day holiday, vote No on Proposition 301 and
Yes on Proposition 302.
If you support a King Day but would eliminate Columbus Day, vote Yes on Proposition 301 and No on Proposition 302.
60.
ELECTION

61.

ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL

153-63 (Nov. 6, 1990).
ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL

ELECTION 154-56 (Proposition 301) (Nov. 6, 1990).
62. See THE ARIZONA YEARBOOK: A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT IN THE GRAND
CANYON STATE 156 (1991); see also OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE,
STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANVASS, GENERAL ELECTION 12 (1990).
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If you oppose a King Day, but support a Columbus
Day, vote No on both propositions.6 3
Voters who filled out their ballots as instructed would cast a "No"
vote on either Proposition 301 or Proposition 302. The end
result is that two proposals divided the vote of the Martin Luther
King holiday supporters, thereby enabling a minority of their
opponents to prevail in the election.6 4
In addition to causing skewed results, another potential
problem may arise when multiple propositions dealing with the
same issue appear on one ballot. In some cases, opponents of an
initiative or referendum may place on a ballot a "rival" proposition which deals with the same issue, partially to attract some of
the vote, and partially in an attempt to confuse voters. Consider
in this regard the four Propositions on Arizona's 1984 General
Election Ballot proposing the regulation of hospital costs, the
four Propositions on Arizona's 1986 ballot involving tort and
insurance reform, and the five Propositions on California's 1988
ballot relating to auto insurance.6 5 In these instances, many benefits of direct democracy were undermined by gamesmanship.
Some sponsors of these ballot measures might not have had a
serious hope of passing their propositions, but introduced their
measures anyway in an attempt both to confuse voters (in part,
by cluttering the ballot) and to solicit "No" votes on all the
related proposals.6 6
2.

Too Many Propositions on the Ballot Overall

Another problem involves the sheer quantity of measures
which voters are asked to resolve on a ballot. In recent years, the
number of propositions in many states has been staggering. In
California, for example, there have been 167 Propositions since
63. All Those Propositions: Some are Major, Some Less So; All Of Them Deserve
an Informed Vote, PHOENIX GAZETrE, Nov. 5, 1990, at All; see also ARIZONA

156
(Nov. 6, 1990).
64. The elections results paint a startling picture. Proposition 301
received 768,763 "No" votes to its 251,308 "Yes" votes. Proposition 302 received
535,151 "No" votes and 517,882 "Yes" votes. Thus, the two Propositions
combined received nearly 750,000 affirmative votes in an election in which just
over I million voters participated. Based on the reasonable assumption that
most voters followed the voting scheme suggested by the Publicity Pamphlet
and newspapers to alleviate their confusion, it becomes obvious that a minority
of voters dictated policy over the majority.
65. See Paul F. Eckstein, DirectDemocracy Alive and Generally Well in Arizona,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 1990, at Cl; see also Walters, supra note 2, at 6.
66. Eckstein, supra note 65, at C1.
SECRETARY OF STATE, ARIZONA PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION
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the 1982 General Election. 67 Twenty-eight of these were
presented to voters in 1990.68 Arizona has faced a similar,
though not as severe, glut of direct legislation in recent years. In
eight of the last ten elections, Arizona voters have decided thirteen or more ballot propositions. 69

An excessive quantity of ballot propositions causes several
problems. First, voters are exposed to more material and an
increased number of arguments. Not only may the sheer amount
of objective information overwhelm voters, but the biased arguments may confuse them as well. It is estimated that "in 1990 it
would have taken a high school graduate roughly twenty-four
hours to read the 222 page description of the twenty-eight measures on the [California general election] ballot."70 Secondly,
when presented with a glut of propositions, it is argued that people have a tendency to reject everything and preserve the status
quo.71 If this is the case, the advantages of direct legislation are
undermined when voters categorically reject all propositions.
D.

Educating Voters Through Official Publicity Pamphlets

One method of educating citizens about ballot measures is
through the use of official publicity pamphlets. As more and
more propositions appear on the ballot, this avenue of information becomes increasingly important to voters and to each measure's proponents and opponents. There is, however, reason to
question whether this resource is as effective as it could be, or for
that matter, whether it is effective at all.
In 1990, California Secretary of State March Fong Eu distributed two pamphlets to educate voters on the state's twenty-eight
ballot measures.7 2 Citizens had 224 pages of single-spaced print
to read and understand in order to cast educated votes.73 While
this was extraordinary, even elections with fewer ballot measures
require a good deal of reading. The publicity pamphlet for the
1992 California general election (which had thirteen proposi67. CALIFORNIA
GENERAL ELECTION 2

SECRETARY

OF STATE,

CALIFORNIA

BALLOT

PAMPHLET,

(Nov. 3, 1992).
68. Hinds, supra note 4.
69. See Eckstein, supra note 65, at C1.
70. Hinds, supra note 4.
71. Hinds, supra note 4. Indeed, in California's 1990 election, "more
than forty percent of the voters responded to the cluttered ballot by voting 'no'
on all proposals that year." Id.
72. The first pamphlet covered Propositions 124 to 140. The "sequel"
covered Propositions 141 to 151. See Debra J. Saunders, Too Many Initiatives:
Crass Politicians Have Co-Opted the Process, L.A. DAILYJ., Oct. 30, 1990, at 6.
73. Id.
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tions on the ballot) was ninety-six pages of single-spaced type.
Likewise, Arizona's 1992 Publicity Pamphlet for an election with
fourteen ballot propositions consisted of one-hundred twenty
pages, also of single-spaced print."4
It is unreasonable to think that voters can digest such large
quantities of technical information in a cumbersome presentation. Yet, the publicity pamphlets often remain the lone source
of objective information which voters receive. In order both to
prevent voter reliance on newspaper editorials and partisan
advertisements, and also to avoid further voter turn-off,
reforming the complexity of publicity pamphlets is essential.
E.

Problems Controlling the Effects of Direct Democracy

The final problem with direct legislation through initiatives
and referenda involves the effects of the elections. Voters are
frequently encouraged to examine the merits of proposed legislation. In doing so, the risk arises that they may fail to account for
the results which enacting or defeating a certain proposition
might cause.
Two recent examples clearly illustrate this point. The first
involves Arizona's 1990 dual propositions on the Martin Luther
King holiday. Prior to the election, the public's attention was
focused, not on economics, but instead on civil rights and the
character of Dr. King. 75 Yet, as a result of the holiday's defeat,
Arizona lost an estimated $500 million from roughly 165 groups
which canceled events. 76 Whereas the public failed to account
for the economic realities involved with the issue in 1990, it did
so when the issue was presented again two years later. In fact,
when the holiday measure passed in 1992 with sixty-one percent
of the vote, approximately forty-one percent of the voters who
supported it stated that economic pressures influenced their
77
vote.

Another example of the voters' failure fully to recognize the
effect of their vote is illustrated in Colorado's 1992 election on
Amendment 2. Colorado officials estimate that the state lost in
excess of $10 million in just over one month from a nationwide
74.
75.

ARIZONA PUBLICrrv PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 3, 1992).

See

ARIZONA

SECRETARY

OF STATE,

ARIZONA PUBLicrrY PAMPHLET,

GENERAL ELECTnON 156-63 (Of the eleven arguments favoring the holiday, only
two presented economic arguments.) (Nov. 6, 1990).
76. Mark Shaffer, Painful Parallel: Arizona's King Day Controversy, ARiz.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 1992, at A12.
77. See King Holiday Vote Statistics, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1992, at A2; see
also David Fritze, Arizonans Bask In King Day Win, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1992,

at Al, A2.
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reaction to this initiative, which prohibited anti-discrimination
laws protecting homosexuals.78
Both of these cases demonstrate how the "law of unintended
consequences" can sometimes plague direct legislation by initiative and referendum.7 9 When this occurs, state officials are in a
no-win situation. If, on one hand, they vote to ameliorate the
adverse consequences of a given election, they are working
against the expressed will of the people. If, on the other hand,
they choose inaction and allow the consequences to unfold without correction, officials risk statewide economic losses, nationwide scorn, the wrath of their constituents for inaction, and
another proposition amending the policy on the next general
election ballot.
III.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES

Many of the problems identified in the previous section can
be addressed with legislation. This section will discuss various
alternatives which state legislators should consider. Although the
operational difficulty of these proposals varies, they nevertheless
respond to issues which lawmakers need to address to correct the
excesses of direct legislation.
Proposal One States should require that all initiative petitions be submitted to legislative counsel for
analysis and recommendations prior to distribution for signatures.
This reform addresses the problems arising from poor drafting of initiatives.80 Although the legislative counsel's recommen.dations would be non-binding, this step would inevitably cure
-many ambiguities which otherwise would make their way to the
ballot. Moreover, this process would occur before obtaining the
signatures for initiative. To fund this reform, the sponsors of the
ballot measure should pay a nominal fee to absorb some of the
state's costs. 8 1
78. Mark Shaffer, Colorado Faces a Rocky Future: Anti-Gay Vote Spurs
Potentially Expensive Backlash, ARIz. REPuBLIc, Dec. 27, 1992, at Al.
79. John Mark, Reforms: Will they help, or will they hurt?, PHOENIX GAZET-rE,
Oct. 24, 1992, at A13.
80. Note that this reform applies only to initiatives and not to referenda.
This accounts for the different origin of these two forms of direct legislation.
Because referenda have been considered by the state legislature, they generally
have been amended, discussed, and clarified by legislative counsel and
legislators.
81. Another reform, albeit dubious, would allow non-material changes to
the text of the initiatives after the sponsors had obtained signatures.- The
advantage of such a policy is that clarifications could, in some cases, be easily
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Proposal Two-. State courts should strictly apply a single- subject rule for both proposed statutes and constitutional amendments.
This standard of review would address the problems created
by logrolling in ballot measures. Courts should apply a test similar to that used by Arizona courts - namely, one which examines whether there is a reasonable expectation that voters will
either approve or reject all of the provisions contained within a
proposition." Moreover, this standard of review should be
applied for both proposed constitutional amendments and
statutes.
Proposal Three States should enact statutory deadlines for
challenges to ballot measures.
A deadline will effectively counter the ambush tactics which
were displayed most clearly with Arizona's Proposition 110 in
1992. This proposal is simple, virtually cost-free, and will provide
parties on both sides with the opportunity not only to present
their legal and equitable arguments, but also to be given due
consideration, full adjudication, and all appeals of right. Such a
deadline should occur no later than one month before the ballots must be printed. After the deadline has passed, the statute
should also divest the state courts of jurisdiction over ballot measure challenges until after the election. Finally, some states may
need to establish earlier deadlines for the submission of signatures in order to effectuate this proposal.8 3
ProposalFour States should enact statutes that empower the
Secretary of State to prohibit any initiative or
referendum from being printed on election
ballots if the proposition contains a provision
that: i) invidiously discriminates against an
discerned by examining the literature and message which the initiative's
sponsors distributed to the general public. The shortfall of this reform (one
which I find persuasive) is that the provision would be changed AFTER
signatures had been obtained. Although most non-material clarifications would

not invalidate the consent of those who signed the petition, there may be some
people who signed the initiative petition precisely because it was ambiguous, or
because they read the ambiguous language differently from the way the
legislative counsel read it. Therefore, I do not recommend this reform.
82.

Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367 (Ariz. 1987).

83. For example, the last day to file initiative petitions with the Secretary
of State's Office for the 1992 Arizona General Election was July 2, 1992. By
moving this deadline for submission forward into early June, the state could
have designated July 2, 1992 as the deadline for filing pre-election legal
challenges. See OFFICE OF ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, 1992 ELECTION
INFORMATION FLIER 1 (rev. June 5, 1992).
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identifiable class of people; or ii) curtails or
deprives civil, human or constitutional rights.
Admittedly, this proposal would be difficult to administer on
an ongoing basis. Such a statute would require the Secretary of
State to interpret each ballot measure before placing it on the
ballot. In addition to these subjective determinations, this proposal would also create the potential for increased pre-election
litigation based upon the Secretary of State's construction of
measures that are kept off of ballots.8 4 Despite these difficulties,
there are two considerations - one practical and one philosophical - that support the implementation of this reform.
The practical consideration involves one issue the Colorado
Supreme Court considered in Evans, namely, the interplay
between ballot measures and certain rights. In the conclusion of
its opinion, the court noted:
That Amendment 2 was passed by a majority of voters
through the initiative process as an expression of popular
will mandates great deference. However the facts remain
that "[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and property . . . and

other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no election," 85 and that
"[a] citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed
simply because a majority of people choose that it be."86 ,8 7
If it is likely that a provision will unconstitutionally implicate
these rights, it is a matter of simple fairness to keep it off the
ballot. This will save parties on both sides of an issue large
expenditures of money, time and effort.
In addition to this practical consideration, another argument - namely that made by James Madison in The Federalist,
No. 10 - supports this proposal as well.' In this essay, Madison
notes that there are only two ways to control factions, namely to
remove their causes or to control their effects.8 9 After demonstrating the naivete of removing the causes, he concludes that
84. This also supports my proposal to establish an earlier deadline for
filing ballot measure petitions. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
86. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736
(1964).

87. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.

88.

THE FEDERALiST

Nos. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (Bantam Books

1982).
89. A "faction" is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent or aggregate interests of the community." Id. at 43.
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society must control their effects. 9" Madison notes that it is the
effect that must be controlled when a faction consists of the
majority, as occurred in Colorado on Amendment 2. In this
instance, Madison reasons that the faction "must be rendered, by
their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry
into effect schemes of oppression." 9 He concludes that only a
republican form of government can control these excesses of
democracy, as all public policies will pass through "a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial
92
considerations."
In sum, if our society does pass laws that appear to: i) discriminate against identifiable classes of people; or ii) endanger
civil, human, and constitutional rights, such laws should not
come from initiatives or referenda. Rather, they should be negotiated, tailored, and modified through the deliberate legislative
process to minimize the risk of the appearance becoming a
reality.
Proposal Five:. State legislatures should consider statutory
mechanisms that address the problem of multiple ballot measures involving the same issue.
Although difficult to implement, the problems created by
multiple propositions on one issue might be solved by adopting
an incremental process. One possible option is to enact a statutory scheme which requires the Secretary of State, upon presentation of a second ballot measure (initiative or referendum)
addressing the same issue as a proposition already appearing on
the ballot, to separate the policy and the procedures within the
proposals. The Secretary of State would then place on the ballot
one proposition that presents a general policy question to voters.
Immediately thereafter, the Secretary of State would list the proposed methods of effectuating the policy. If one of these propositions received a majority vote, it would become the law of the
state. If more than one received a majority vote (as voters could
vote in favor for more than one), the proposal receiving the largest number of votes would prevail. If neither of these propositions received a majority vote, the voters will have passed a statute
which (i) establishes a particular policy, and (ii) orders the state
legislature to enact the means of enforcing the policy before the
end of the ensuing legislative session.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
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Applying this reform to the 1990 Arizona Martin Luther
King holiday vote demonstrates how it could operate effectively.
With this reform in place, Arizona voters would have had to first
answer Proposition 300 (i.e. "Do you favor a paid state holiday in
honor of Dr. Martin Luther King?"). Voters would then choose
the specific method of effectuating this policy from those proposals which had been introduced through initiatives or referenda.
Thus, they would then vote on Proposition 301 ("Do you favor
maintaining the existing number of paid state holidays by eliminating Columbus Day as a paid holiday, and replacing it with a
paid Martin Luther King day?") and Propositions 302 ("Do you
favor creating an additionalpaid state holiday on Martin Luther
King day?"). Assuming that the election results were identical to
those of 1990, neither Propositions 301 nor 302 would have
obtained a majority. Thus, the voters would have (i) enacted a
paid state holiday honoring Dr. King, and (ii) ordered the legislature to enact the details before the end of the 1991 legislative
session.
Adopting an incremental reform has three advantages over
the current system. First, it allows voters to approve understandable general policies, without the confusion of details. The people could reject all specific proposals, and yet resolve a policy
question which the legislature refused to address. Second, it
allows voters to approve a general policy without espousing
poorly drafted statutes on either side. The legislature would be
left to draft language which would pass Constitutional muster.
Finally, gamesmen who introduce additional propositions with
the intent of confusing voters with details may be discouraged
from doing so.
ProposalSix: State legislatures should investigate ways to cap
the number of ballot measures presented to
voters in each election.
Three reforms are possible, although none appears promising. The first of these would establish an increased number of
signatures for a proposal to be placed on the ballot. Practically
speaking, this is naive, as petitions submitted generally contain
more than the statutorily-required number of signatures. Ethically speaking, such a proposal is suspect, as it hinders and may
prohibit small, under-funded groups-one of the intended beneficiaries of direct democracy-from placing propositions on the
ballot.
The second reform is constitutionally problematic. It arises
as a response to an emerging trend. High-ranking state officials
(legislators, governors, and attorney generals) sometimes choose
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to pursue their agendas by means of direct legislation instead of
through their official capacities.9 Restricting or curtailing their
ability to introduce initiatives or sponsor referenda is a possible
response to this phenomena. However, this could invade their
constitutional freedom of association and perhaps their constitutional freedom of speech. Thus, while this reform is well-intentioned, it would be constitutionally questionable.
The third attempt to limit the number of measures on the
ballot would allow proposals to be submitted first to the legislature for consideration, and thereafter to the voters only if the
legislature failed to enact it.9 4 The impact of such a reform is
questionable for two reasons. First, this would only apply to initiatives, as referenda already are considered and passed by the
state legislatures. Second, given the increased use of direct
democracy by state officials, their willingness to consider and
enact initiative legislation is doubtful. Few, if any, ballot measures would be eliminated by this reform.
As this analysis indicates, controlling the quantity of propositions on the ballot will remain a perplexing problem. The solution, therefore, for resolving the problems of voter confusion
and voter turnoff rests largely in the area of educating voters, a
matter that I discuss in my next proposal.
ProposalSeven: States must enact more effective methods of
educating voters both through publicity pamphlets and through other innovative
methods.
California has taken several steps in this direction. First, its
Ballot Pamphlet contains a summary of each proposition in the
front of the publication. This consists of a description of the proposal, brief arguments for and against the measure, sponsors and
opponents of the proposal, and organizations to contact for
more information.9 5 Second, the pamphlet now contains a Legislative Analyst's evaluation of each proposition, followed by up
to one page of arguments and rebuttals by sponsors and opponents. Thus, California's printing format consolidates arguments. The third method California has used to disseminate the
information contained in the publicity pamphlets involves cassettes. Voters can now request an audio version of the pamphlet
93. For excellent examples of this problem, see Saunders, supra note 72,
at 6, and Hinds, supra note 4.

94.
95.

Sweeney, supra note 4, at 1.
CALIFORNIA

SECRETARY

OF STATE,

CALIFORNIA

BALLOT

PAMPHLET,

GENERAL ELECTION 4-7 (Brief Summary of the Measures) (Nov. 3, 1992).
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from most public libraries.9 6 All of California's reforms assist voters in muddling through vast amounts of information. Other
states should adopt these reforms, as they are methods of conveying information to voters in a simple, yet fair, format.
In addition to reviewing the contents of the ballot pamphlets, states should examine their distribution policies as well.
Arizona's legislature addressed this problem in 1991, when it
mandated that sample election ballots "include a statement that
information on how to obtain a publicity pamphlet for general
election ballot propositions is available by calling the county election office."9 7 This reform does not go far enough to educate
voters. Not only did Arizona voters have to muddle through the
information contained in the publicity pamphlets, but they also
were required to locate and to pick up these brochures for the
1992 general election. 9 8 Such a policy fosters ignorant voting,
and enhances the influence of the media and the advertisements. Arizona and other states should, at a minimum, evaluate
the costs and benefits of amending their publicity pamphlet distribution statutes so that one pamphlet is mailed to EVERY
99
ADDRESS at which a registered voter resides.
One final reform that all states allowing direct legislation
should consider is utilizing television as a supplement to the publicity pamphlet. By creating a videocassette which presents up to
five minutes of legislative analysis, five minutes of arguments for,
and five minutes of arguments against each ballot measure, the
public could educate itself in a relatively brief period. Such a
program would be available for voters on VCR tapes in much the
same way as the audio-cassettes are distributed by California and
could be broadcast repeatedly on public-access cable channels.
Moreover, certain citizen groups or even the state could
purchase air time and broadcast the program on public television. These Ross Perot-style "infomercials" would provide a
"user-friendly" method of voter education. Such programs may
enable the state eventually to revise and reduce its publishing of
some ballot pamphlets.
96.

Id. at 96.

97.

ARiz. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 19-123(D) (1992).

98. Absentee ballots also did not include Publicity Pamphlets.
Considering that the absentee ballot is used by people who are house ridden or
institutionalized (such as the elderly-a sizable population in Arizona) and
those who would be out of town, it is ludicrous for the Legislature to require
these groups to locate and obtain Publicity Pamphlets.
99.

CALIFORNA

GENERAL ELECTION
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96 (Nov. 3, 1992).
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Proposal Eight. States should consider enacting statutes
which would permit its legislature and governor to suspend enforcement of a newly
enacted law or constitutional amendment
which arises from a ballot measure
temporarily.
Admittedly, this is an extreme suggestion. Nevertheless,
losses similar to those experienced by Arizona in response to the
outcome of the 1990 Martin Luther King holiday referendum
were also severe. By enacting back door procedures that would
enable the legislature and the governor temporarily to suspend
enforcement of a given law or constitutional amendment temporarily, citizens of a state would, in essence, issue themselves an
insurance policy. After the state had experienced "severe consequences"' 0 0 resulting from an initiative or referendum measure,
the governor could order legislative leaders from both parties, as
well as leading proponents and opponents of the troubling
amendment to meet and negotiate how satisfactorily to amend
the statute. If the parties agree on a change, the amended provision would be enforced until the next general election, at which
time the voters would approve or reject the compromise. In the
likely event that no agreement was forthcoming, however, the
governor could continue suspending enforcement of the law
until a special election for reconsideration was held. If such an
election became necessary, the legislature could propose germane alternatives to the original provision for voter consideration as well.
Once again, this reform may prove to be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, it would provide two benefits which do not
exist in the present system. First, it empowers state officials to
remedy severely problematic statutes or constitutional amendments without allowing devastating losses to accrue until the following general election. Second, because the process is initiated
by the governor, this "back door" would lend itself only to
extreme situations, for fear of political backlash which could
arise from both questioning the supremacy of voters and incurring needless expenses for the state.

100. This term could be interpreted using a "totality of the
circumstances" standard, yet should remain undefined. Attaching dollar
amounts to determine severity would be unwise, as the severe consequences
may not be entirely economic.
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CONCLUSION

Direct legislation through initiatives and referenda is a feature of the American political landscape that has provided many
positive contributions to our system of democracy, including a
check on government. Several problems with direct legislation,
however, have arisen in modern times. Reforming those problematic aspects of initiatives and referenda that I have focused
upon would preserve and enhance the valuable contributions of
these processes to our democracy. Doing so can only invigorate
the voice that citizens have in their government.

